IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION





UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, : Case No. CR-1-93-054

(Honorable Carl B. Rubin, Judge)

Plaintiff, :



-vs- :



xxxxxxxxxxxxxx, et al., :



Defendants. :





DEFENDANT xxxxxxxxxxxxxx MOTION

FOR DISCLOSURE OF IMPEACHING INFORMATION

AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION



Defendant, xxxx. xxxxxx, by and through undersigned counsel, respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order directing the Government to make diligent inquiry and disclose all of the following within its possession, custody or control or the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could become known to the Government.

Any and all records and information revealing felony convictions, guilty verdicts or juvenile adjudications of each witness (a) to be called by the Government at the trial, (b) who testified before any grand jury concerning this case, or (c) who furnished oral or written statements during the investigation of this case (hereinafter jointly referred to as "government witnesses"), including but not limited to relevant "rap sheets".

Any and all records and information revealing prior misconduct or bad acts attributed to each government witness.

Any and all consideration or promise of consideration given to or on behalf of each government witness. By "consideration", Defendant refers to anything of value or use, including but not limited to criminal, civil or tax immunity grants; assistance or favorable treatment or recommendations with respect to any criminal, civil, tax court, court of claims, administrative or other legal dispute with the Government (state or federal), or any other parties; payments of money or fees, such as witness fees and special witness fees, provision of food, clothing, shelter, transportation or other like benefits; placement in a witness protection program"; and any other matter, without limitation, which could reveal an interest or bias in the witness in favor of the Government or against the defense, or act as an inducement to testify, to color testimony, or to refuse to discuss testimony or facts with defense counsel.

Any and all criminal prosecutions, investigations and potential prosecutions pending or which could be brought against each government witness, any probationary, parole, and deferred prosecution status of each government witness, and any civil, tax court, court of claims, administrative, and other pending or potential legal disputes and/or transactions each government witness may have with the Government (state or federal).

The existence and identification of each occasion on which each government witness has testified before any court, grand jury, and other tribunal or body, and/or otherwise narrated the details of this investigation, or the facts of this case.

The existence and identification of each occasion on which each government witness who is an alleged informant, alleged accomplice, alleged co-conspirator, or alleged expert has testified, been examined, or furnished a sworn or unsworn statement to or before any court, grand jury, administrative agency, or other tribunal or body.

Any and all personnel files and/or the existence and identity of an Government files concerning the government witness or in which the government witness is mentioned; including without limiting the generality thereof, the computer storage records at El Paso Intelligence Center, El Paso, Texas; or, if no longer there, wherever presently located.

Any and all other records and information which are helpful or useful to the defense in impeaching a government witness, or otherwise detracting from the probative force of the Government's evidence, or which could lead to discovery of such records or information, or which is material either to guilt or punishment of this Defendant.



Respectfully submitted,



SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ







__________________________________________

MARTIN S. PINALES (Ohio Bar No. 0024570)

920 Fourth & Race Tower

105 W. Fourth Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2776

Telephone (513) 721-4876



Attorney for Defendant Djuan A. xxxxxxxx



MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

FOR DISCLOSURE OF IMPEACHING INFORMATION



I.



INTRODUCTION



The Defendant has moved for disclosure of "impeaching information", in order to protect his rights to a fair trial.

A. The Duty of Disclosure

Due process prevents the Government from suppressing evidence favorable to the accused, either as to guilt or punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Brady, supra, teaches that due process requires, at an appropriate time, production of evidence which is materially favorable to the accused, either as direct or impeaching evidence. Williams v. Dutton, 400 F.2d 797, 800 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1105; Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935); Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942). This requirement of candor by the sovereign encompasses information bearing upon the credibility of its witnesses as well as matters material to the issues of guilt or punishment. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Williams v. Dutton, supra. As stated by the Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois, supra, at 269:

The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty may depend.

 

Moreover, in this federal prosecution, the Court's supervisory power to safeguard "the correct administration of justice in the federal courts" reinforces the due process requirement of disclosure. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825, 832 (2d Cir. 1969). See generally, Communist Party of the United States v. S.A.C.B., 351 U.S. 115, 124 (1956).

B. Pretrial Disclosure is Necessary

Disclosure of information impeaching the credibility of witnesses must be timed to enable effective preparation for trial. United States v. Polisi, 416 F.2d 573, 578 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 173-174 (9th Cir. 1973); cert. denied, 416 U.S. 940 (1974). As pointed out in United States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 924 (Lumbard, J., sitting by designation):

Disclosure by the government must be made at such a time as to allow the defense to sue the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case, even if satisfaction of this criterion requires pretrial disclosure.Indeed, even when the favorable information takes the form of a witness statement otherwise protected from pretrial discovery by the Jencks Act (18 U.S.C. §3500), the prosecution must nonetheless disclose it as far in advance of trial as Due Process may practically require for the defense to make fair use of it. E.g., United States v. Narciso, 446 F.Supp. 252, 270-71 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. Houston, 339 F.Supp. 762, 765-66 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Eley, 335 F.Supp. 353, 358 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Gleason, 265 F.Supp. 880, 887 (S.D. N.Y. 1967), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1972). Compare United States v. Campagnuolo, 592 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1979). Brady supra, overrides the Jencks Act, on the timing of production where lack of pretrial discovery results in prejudice to the defendant "of a substantial character". Harris v. United States, 458 F.2d 670, 677 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 888 (1973); United States v. Felts, 497 F.2d 80, 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974); United States v. Kaplan, 554 F.2d 577, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1977).

Indeed, pretrial disclosure is required in the interest of justice. It is recognized that even Jencks disclosure before trial "is a salutary practice and we encourage it". United States v. Murphy, 569 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955 (1978).

Significantly, this pretrial motion does not call upon the Court to overturn a conviction or to weigh such questions as materiality and prejudice in retrospective review of a trial record, the usual vantage point of the appellate decisions. See United States v. Five Persons, 472 F.Supp. 64, 68 (D.N.J. 1979). Rather, the Court must prospectively decide under Brady whether "the subject matter of the [specific] request if material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists." United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Furthermore, the Court must also prospectively decide under Rule 16(a)(1)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure whether the request embraces matter which is "material to the preparation of [the] defense." As to Rule 16(a)(1)(C), one court noted the special materiality of impeaching information:

". . . aside from outright exculpatory items, it is difficult to imagine information more material to the preparation of the defense than credibility items for critical or major government witnesses." United States v. Five Persons, 472 F.Supp. 64, 67 (D.N.J. 1979).

Numerous district courts have ordered such discovery both before and after the 1975 amendments which further liberalize Rule 16. Eg. United States v. Thevis, 84 F.R.D. 47 (N.D. Ga. 1979); United States v. Five Persons, 472 F.Supp. 64 (D.N.J. 1979); United States v. Goldman, 439 F.Supp. 337, 349 (S.D. N.Y. 1977); United States v. Dillard, 419 F.Supp. 1000, 1001 (N.D. Ill. 1976); United States v. Deutsch, 373 F.Supp. 289, 290-91 (S.D. N.Y. 1974); United States v. Quinn, 364 F.Supp. 432, 440 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Houston, 339 F.Supp. 762, 764 (N.D. Ga. 1972); United States v. Eley, 335 F.Supp. 353, 355-58 (N.D. Ga. 1972);United States v. Ahmad, 53 F.R.D. 186, 193-94 (M.D. Pa. 1971); United States v. Gleason, 265 F.Supp. 880, 884-87 (S.D. N.Y. 1967).

Even assuming due process itself does not require disclosure, the ends of judicial economy, careful trial preparation and clarity of evidentiary presentation will be greatly benefitted by pretrial production of the requests we make here. If such disclosure is delayed until the eve of trial, the Defendant may find himself unprepared or the Government may inadvertently forget items it is required to produce as a result of nothing more than the crush of last-minute details. The Defendant would then be required to cry "foul" or claim prejudice, and delay the procession of trial activities increasing the length of the trial.

We submit, these possibilities can be obviated by permitting disclosure now.

C. The Scope of Impeachment Evidence Requested

Wigmore has defined the process of impeaching testimonial evidence as the general logical process of explaining or discrediting the assertions of a witness by reference to the "human element in [the] testimony:"

But A's assertion that a street lamp was lighted at a given time or place is generally of a piece with hundreds of thousands of former evidential data, viz, it is a human assertion, resting for credit on human qualities. The human element in this testimony is an element in common, running through the vast mass of prior human testimonies. And even though human beings differ, yet their differences also are generic, each on a vast scale. Moral character, bias, experience, powers of perception in light and dark, powers of memory after a lapse of time, susceptibility to falsify under torture, - these and other qualities have been under observation in so many thousands of instances under varying conditions that we have built up generalizations (more or less correct or uniform), which pass for general truths (or at least, as working guides) on those subjects. In short, we possess a fund of general principles, applicable to specific instances of this class of evidence, and almost totally lacking for specific circumstantial evidence. (Emphasis in original).



3 Wigmore, Evidence, §587 at 362-63 (3d ed. 1940). We are concerned with gaining adequate information regarding these "general principles" of crediting and discrediting witnesses.

McCormick has identified "five main lines of attack upon the credibility of a witness:"

There are five main lines of attack upon the credibility of a witness. The first, and probably the most effective and most frequently employed, is an attack by proof that the witness on a previous occasion has made statements inconsistent with his present testimony. The second is an attack by showing that the witness is biased on account of emotional influences such as kinship for one party or hostility to another, or motives of pecuniary interest, whether legitimate or corrupt. The third is an attack upon the character of the witness, The fourth is an attack by showing a defect of capacity in the witness to observe, remember or recount the matters testified about. The fifth is proof by other witnesses that material facts are otherwise than as testified to by the witness under attack.



McCormick, Evidence, §33 at 66 (2d ed. 1972).



As can be seen, impeachment is not limited to discrediting ones character for veracity. 3 Wigmore, Evidence, §874 at 362 n.1 (3d ed. 1940). Nor is the process limited to cross-examination. Extrinsic evidence showing bias, for example, may be elicited. Eg., Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556, 562 & n.13 (8th Cir. 1975).

With these general principles in mind, we address ourselves to the specifics of this Motion.

II.

SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR DISCLOSURE

To help focus the duty of disclosure, Defendant has itemized likely sources of impeaching information which may be within the knowledge of the prosecution:

Item 1. Defendant's request for information regarding prior felony convictions and juvenile adjudications invokes a classic avenue of impeachment which appears directly within the ambit of Rule 609 of the Rules of Evidence. The Conference Committee Report to that rule speaks in terms of "the need for the trier of the fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible." H.R.Rep. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). See generally, Beaudine v. United States, 368 F.2d 417, 421-22 (5th Cir. 1966). The inclusion of "guilty verdicts" in the request results from decisions authorizing their use, even though not reduced to judgment, for purposes of impeachment. United States v. Caraday, 466 F.2d 1191 (9th Cir. (1972) (per curiam); United States v. Rose, 541 F.2d 750 (8th Cir. 1976). Thus, disclosure is plainly in order. See, eg. United States v. Quinn, 364 F.Supp. 432, 445 (N.D. Ga. 1973) affirmed on other ground, 514 F.2d 1250 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moceri, 359 F.Supp. 431, 435 (N.D. Ohio 1973); United States v. Leta, 60 F.R.D. 127, 131 (M.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F.Supp. 723, 736 (N.D. Ill. 1971). For convenience it should also extend to production of any and all so-called "rap sheets" for the witness.

Item 2. The Federal Rules of Evidence grant the Court discretion to permit a defendant to cross-examine a witness regarding specific instances of misconduct (so-called "bad acts") even though such behavior does not amount to felony conviction, if the evidence impeaches the witness' credibility. Rule 608(b), Federal Rules of Evidence. The purpose of such testimony is to attack the witness' character for truthfulness, and not to establish bias, interest, or prejudice. See, McCormick, Evidence, §42 at 83 (2d ed. 1972). Since this is a permissible area of inquiry, the prosecution must disclose to the defense any behavior of its witnesses which may reasonably be construed as such "bad acts".

Item 3. The Government has a constitutional obligation to disclose any and all consideration which it has held out to a witness or which the witness anticipates, since such consideration directly invokes an inference of bias or interest. See generally, United States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir. 1977). A common example of such matter which must be disclosed to the defense is the making of promises or the holding out of other inducements for a witness to cooperate and testify against the Defendant. See, eg., United States v. Baskes, 649 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Esposito, 523 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 916 (1976); United States v. Harris, 498 F.2d 1164, 1168 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974); United States v. Tashman, 478 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1.973); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1972). In Giglio vs. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the Supreme Court made plain that this is an affirmative duty which the Government must discharge responsibly, and that the ignorance of one prosecutor about the promises made to a government witness by another prosecutor does not excuse the failure to disclose. In the instant case, the prosecution is obliged to make appropriate inquiry and search to determine what consideration, broadly defined, it has offered to or bestowed upon its witnesses; including, but not limited to, any beneficial treatment in the tax realm, not being charged as a co-conspirator, or any other area related in this Motion.

Items 3 and 4. In addition to promises of consideration which might promote a witness' cooperation with the Government, the Defendant is entitled to be advised of any matter which might cause a witness to color his testimony in favor of the Government out of fear, or interest in self-preservation. In this regard, sometimes it is overlooked that evidence of wrongdoing, even though not amounting to a felony conviction of comparable evidence of moral turpitude or bad character, may nonetheless be adduced when relevant to show the bias or self-interest of the witness. McCormick, Evidence, §40 at 78-80 (2d ed. 1972). Typical of this category is information concerning the witness' possible vulnerability to prosecution, parole or probation revocation, or other sanction by the Government. See, eg., United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976) (threat by FBI agent to prosecute witness intended to induce witness' cooperation). In United States v. Bonanno, 430 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1971), the Court condemned the government's failure to disclose an outstanding indictment against its witness since the pendency of the charge would have shown "possible motivation of the witness to testify favorably for the Government." 430 F.2d at 1062. Similarly, in United States v. Padgent, 432 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1970), the Court reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that his counsel had been denied the right to question a government witness on cross-examination with regard to the witness' vulnerability to indictment for bail jumping. See also, United States v. Crumley, 565 F.2d 945, 949-50 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Gerard, 491 F.2d 1300, 1304 (9th Cir. 1974); Thomas v. United States, 343 F.2d 49 (9th Cir. 1965).

Motivations other than fear of criminal sanctions are also material. See, e.g., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 307 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Haderlein, 118 F.Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1953) (threat to revoke citizenship). Thus, the prosecution should disclose such sources of bias or interest as potential financial reward by the United States, Wheeler v. United States, 351 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1965) or, on the other hand, civil tax liability to the United States - even though in either event no promises of consideration may have been made. See also, United States v. Clark, 649 F.2d 534, 543 (7th Cir. 1981). The mere fact of a witness' imprisonment would qualify, since he might well be affected by fear or favor growing out of his detention. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 693 (1931). See also, United States v. Garcia, 531 F.2d 1303, 1306-07 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976). The witness' expectations, hopes, or fears are controlling.

Item 5. The existence and identification of each occasion on which the witness has testified, or otherwise narrated the facts, should be disclosed so that Defendant can order transcripts of testimony for use in cross-examination or can investigate sources of extrinsic impeachment, for example. McCormick points out that:

When a witness testified to the facts material in a case the opponent may have available proof that the witness has previously made statements that are inconsistent with his present testimony. Under a modern view of the hearsay rule, these previous statements would be admissible as substantive evidence of the fact stated.

McCormick, Evidence, §34 at 67 (2d ed. 1972). See also, Rules 801(d)(1) and 806, Federal Rules of Evidence. If the Government has available information which may lead to proof of prior inconsistent statements or other evidence helpful to the accused, fundamental fairness requires that it be turned over to the defense. Davis v. Heyd, 479 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1973) (writ granted where undisclosed prior statements of state witness corroborated defense theory and contradicted his testimony at trial). See also, Monroe v. Blackburn, 607 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Butler v. Maroney, 319 F.2d 622 (3d Cir. 1963).

This pretrial Motion is not directly concerned with prior statements which may be producible only at trial because of the "Jencks Act", 18 U.S.C. §3500, or because the statements may be used to refresh the recollection of a witness. Bradford v. United States, 271 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1959). Rather, we primarily seek identification whether such statements exist and pretrial disclosure of statements not "in the possession of the United States," 18 U.S.C. §3500(a), or not made "to an agent of the Government," id., so that the statements may be obtained from other sources. The Government should identify the sources of information which will allow Defendant to make his own pursuit of justice. See, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971) (indigent defendant entitled to free transcript, or adequate transcript substitute of prior trial).

Item 6. If the witness is an informer, accomplice, or co-conspirator, the Defendant should also be advised of all occasions, known to the Government, on which the witness has previously testified. As to such crucial and inherently suspect witnesses, the Defendant must have the greatest possible latitude in investigation as well as cross-examination. United States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d 245, 248-49 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Alvarez-Lopez, 559 F.2d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Brewer, 521 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1975).

The same capability to assess all prior testimony of expert witnesses is also necessary if there is to be true confrontation and cross-examination. McConnell v. United States, 393 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1968) (defendant entitled to impeach handwriting expert by showing mistaken identification at another, albeit related, trial).

Item 7. It has been held that, where a Government employee serves as a prosecution witness, the defendant is entitled to have access to his or her government personnel file in order to ascertain whether there is information within it which could be of an impeaching nature. United States v. Austin, 492 F.Supp. 502 (D.C. Ill. 1980); United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55, 58 (5th Cir. 1973); Renshaw v. Ravert, 82 F.R.D. 361, 363-64 (E.D. Pa. 1979). Similarly, in United States v. Morell, 524 F.2d 550 552-55 (2d Cir. 1975), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant was entitled to impeaching information from the confidential file of an informant witness.

This Motion is directed to files to which the Government has access. As to personnel files (government or otherwise), all should be disclosed on the authority of United States v. Austin, supra, and United States v. Deutsch, supra. As to government files generally, all should be identified so that specific and appropriate motions can be addressed to them.

Item 8. It is noted in passing that the definition of the word "witness" in the Motion includes certain "nonwitnesses." If the Government seeks to make its proof against the Defendant by introducing the declarations of non-witnesses, the Defendant is permitted to impeach such declarants. Rule 806, Federal Rules of Evidence. Indeed, such statements in the nature of common law hearsay authorize impeachment in the same way as if the declarant testified at the trial. See, 32 Wigmore, Evidence, §884 (3d ed. 1940).

Item 9. The final item is a catch-all. The Government must not suppress and keep from disclosure evidence of "basic mental trouble" suffered by a witness. Wimon v. Powell, 293 F.2d 605, 606 (5th Cir. 1961). See generally, United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 762-64 (5th Cir. 1974). Further, if, for bizarre example, the Government has used hypnosis for hypnotic age regression in the preparation of its witnesses, the Defendant is entitled to pretrial disclosure of the facts. Such methods are not unknown. United States v. Miller, 411. F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969). Emmet v. Ricketts, 397 F.Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975). See also, United States v. Hart, 344 F.Supp. 522 (E.D. N.Y. 1971) (polygraph or other lie detection techniques). The same requirement of disclosure, of course, would be true if the Government knew a witness had an appetite for narcotic drugs at the time of the relevant events, United States v. Kinard, 465 F.2d 566, 570-74 (D.C. Cir. 1972), or during trial, Wilson v. United States, 232 U.S. 563, 568 (1914), or if a witness harbored a distaste for the defendant, eg. United States v. Haggett, 438 F.2d 396, 398-40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 946 (1971), cf., United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 307 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980), or those of the defendant's ilk. See, e.g., United States v. Kartman, 417 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1969).

Impeachment comes in many forms and to the extent that the Government recognizes it -- either by virtue of the suggestions in this Motion or otherwise -- the evidence for such purposes may not be suppressed, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v. Maryland, supra.

Respectfully submitted,



SIRKIN, PINALES, MEZIBOV & SCHWARTZ







__________________________________________

MARTIN S. PINALES (Ohio Bar No. 0024570)

920 Fourth & Race Tower

105 W. Fourth Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-2776

Telephone (513) 721-4876



Attorney for Defendant xxxx xxxxxxxx





CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE



I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion was delivered by regular U.S. mail to the following persons on the ____ day of June, 1993:





Robert Brichler Thomas W. Miller

Assistant United States Attorney W. Kelly Johnson

Room 220 2602 Central Trust Tower

U.S. Courthouse One West Fourth Street

100 East Fifth Street Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Mark S. Krumbein

Rebecca K. Kaye 511 Walnut Street

1600 Star Bank Center Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3117

425 Walnut Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 David J. Scacchetti

601 Main Street

Peter Rosenwald Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

2602 Central Trust Tower

One West Fourth Street John H. Burlew

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 30 East Central Parkway

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Dennis Alerding

808 Scott Street Michael G. Kohn

Covington, Kentucky 41011 P.O. Box 8157

2690 Madison Road

Tracy Hunter Cincinnati, Ohio 45208

3569 Reading Road

Cincinnati, Ohio 45229

Paul E. Balash

1014 Vine Street

Thomas R. Koustmer Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

5 W. Fourth Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 Kenneth L. Lawson

3569 Reading Road

Henry E. Sheldon, II Cincinnati, Ohio 45229

1618 Sycamore Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45210 Herbert J. Haas

1014 Vine Street

Mark Wayne Napier Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

2400 Kroger Building

1014 Vine Street

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202







MARTIN S. PINALES (Ohio Bar No. 0024570)