IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
)
vs. ) NO. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
)
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx )
____________________________________)
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
REGARDING HANDWRITING
COMPARISON
COMES NOW, the Defendant,xxxxxxxxxx, by and through undersigned counsel and files this Brief in Support of Mr. xxxxx's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony Regarding Handwriting analysis.
Background
Mr. xxxxx has been charged with one count of extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113(a). Mr. xxxxx believes that the government will rely on the opinion of Mr. Larry Ziegler, a Forensic Document Examiner employed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to attempt to establish that Mr. xxxxx engaged in extortion. Evidentiary hearings were held by the Honorable Julie Carnes on January 8 and January 21 through January 23, 1997 in the cases of United States v. Humphreys 1:94-CR-447 (JEC) and United States v. James Martin, Jr., 1:96-CR-287 (JEC). Copies of the transcripts are attached to this pleading. (1)
Overview
Mr. xxxxx contends that the opinion of Mr. Ziegler is inadmissible pursuant to the language of Fed.R.Evid. 702 which states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the tier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Fed.R.Evid. 702.
The opinion of Mr. Ziegler is not admissible as scientific evidence under the Supreme Court's test articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993); United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F.Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Additionally, Mr. Ziegler's opinion is not admissible as "technical or other specialized knowledge" because the opinion will not assist the jury to understand the evidence or determine a relevant fact, and will be unduly prejudicial under Fed.R.Evid. 403. At most, Mr. Ziegler should only be allowed to assist the jury in determining the similarities and differences between the known exemplars of Mr. xxxxx and the extortion note.
ARGUMENT AND CITATION AUTHORITY
A. Introduction/General Principles Regarding the Scientific Prong of Rule 702
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the appropriate standards for admitting expert scientific testimony in federal cases in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.Ct. 2786 (1993). In Daubert, the Supreme Court did away with the old "general acceptance" test for determining the admissibility of expert testimony set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F.1013 (1923), holding that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the Federal Rules of Evidence takes a broader approach to the admissibility of evidence, see Daubert at 2793-94, and a "rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to opinion testimony.'" Id. at 2794 (citing Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. at 169, 109 S.Ct. at 450).
1. The Daubert Approach is Proper in the Context of Forensic Document Examiners
Judge McKenna found that Forensic Document Examiner evidence was not admissible as scientific evidence under Daubert. Starzecpyzel, supra, at 1036. However, the proffered evidence was admissible under "technical or other specialized knowledge." Starzecpyzel, supra at 1038, 1041. In United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit impliedly rejected the technical/scientific distinction. In Lee, the Eleventh Circuit remanded the district court's admission of evidence based on an instrument used to detect drugs. The Lee Court made two interesting observations in remanding. First, it noted that Daubert governs the results of specialized techniques as well as expert testimony because such results are only admissible through an expert. The Lee Court also encouraged the trial court to make specific findings concerning the application of Rule 702 to facilitate appellate review.
In Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F.Supp. 1514 (S.D.Ala. 1996), Chief Judge Butler specifically rejected the plaintiff's argument that proffered testimony by a mechanical engineer regarding the subject of tire failure was mere technical analysis rather than scientific evidence and therefore exempt from Daubert-style scrutiny. The Carmichael Court noted that the argument was meritless and that such a distinction had been impliedly rejected in Lee.
In Cook v. American S.S.Co., 53 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1995) the Sixth Circuit applied the Daubert framework to technical and other specialized knowledge. See also American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining Admissibility of Expert Testimony after Daubert, reprinted in 157 F.R.D. 571 (1994)(arguing Daubert principles should be used to analyze nonscientific expert testimony).
One of the issues in Cook was whether
the defendant's "expert" offered an expert opinion at all. the Cook Court inquired whether the opinion was an
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