Ruben L. Iiguez
Assistant Federal Public Defender
101 SW Main Street, Suite 1700
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 326-2123
Attorney for Defendant
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CR No. xxxxxxxxxxxx
)
Plaintiff, ) DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
) OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO EXCLUDE
vs. ) TESTIMONY OF EYEWITNESS
) IDENTIFICATION EXPERT AND
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, ) REQUEST FOR PRETRIAL HEARING
)
Defendant. )
The defendant, xxxxxxxx, through his attorney, Ruben L. Iiguez, submits the following memorandum in opposition to the government's motion to exclude the trial testimony of Deborah Davis, Ph.D., an eyewitness identification expert. (1) The testimony of Dr. Davis is critical in this case because the government's only evidence against Mr. xxxxxxx derives from eyewitness testimony. (2) Because no other evidence of guilt exists, and the strength of the eyewitness identifications is weak, expert testimony relating to the accuracy of the identifications is highly probative, and is not outweighed by efficiency interests under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Accordingly, the Court should allow Mr. xxxxxxx to call Dr. Deborah Davis as an expert on eyewitness identification at trial. Mr. xxxxxxx also requests that the Court hold a pretrial hearing at which Dr. Davis's proposed testimony and the scientific basis therefor can be presented. (3)
REQUEST FOR A HEARING
In its original trial memorandum, the government acknowledged that a Daubert hearing "clearly ... will be required" in this case to assess the proposed expert testimony (Government Trial Memorandum at n. 2). Now, in its supplemental trial memorandum, the government suggests that no hearing is necessary. As support for this proposition, it cites United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1483 (1997). Hicks involved entirely different circumstances, however, and does not provide guidance for the court in this case.
In Hicks, the district court assumed that the proposed testimony on eyewitnesses met the standards of Daubert but nevertheless excluded it under Rule 403, on the grounds that the testimony would confuse or mislead the jury "and frankly, waste our time at the trial." Hicks, 103 F.3d at 847. Apparently, the district court determined that the expert testimony, although relevant and reliable under Daubert, was of so little probative value as to be "substantially outweighed" by the interests of judicial economy. In Hicks it is not apparent what value the expert testimony would have had: the court does not even mention the existence of any eyewitnesses, and the other evidence against the defendant, including testimony by a co-defendant who was involved in the crime spree, appears abundant. Id. at 839-840 and n.1.
In this case, by contrast, the testimony of the expert is of crucial importance because the government's only evidence of Mr. xxxxxxx's guilt derives from eyewitness testimony. See n. 2, supra. Any expert testimony relating to the accuracy of those identifications is therefore highly probative, and could not easily be outweighed by efficiency interests under Rule 403. Other courts have found that the strength of the other evidence against a defendant is relevant in considering whether an expert on eyewitness testimony should be heard. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532, 535 (4th Cir. 1993) (upholding district court's exclusion of expert testimony based on "cornucopia" of other evidence against defendant); United States v. Jordan, 924 F. Supp. 443, 447 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (admitting expert eyewitness testimony and noting "where a prosecutor relies wholly on eyewitness identifications, such expert testimony should probably be admitted"); cf. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1226-27 (3d Cir. 1985) (in pre-Daubert case, vacating conviction based "primarily" on the testimony of twelve eyewitnesses, because district court excluded expert testimony on eyewitness identifications without a hearing). Thus, unlike in Hicks, the nature of the evidence in this case does not permit the Court to assume that Daubert requirements have been met, but nevertheless exclude the otherwise reliable and relevant testimony under Rule 403. As is set forth more fully in this memorandum, the proposed testimony in this case will not mislead or confuse the jury, and the substance of the testimony cannot be adequately conveyed to the jury through other means, such as jury instructions or cross-examination. The Court should therefore conduct a Daubert hearing to allow the defense to present the basis for this testimony, and should then allow the testimony at trial.
EXPERT EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY
Mr. xxxxxxx has provided notice of his intention to offer the testimony of Dr. Davis, a psychologist with substantial expertise in the field of eyewitness identification. See Declaration of Deborah Davis, Ph.D., filed September 21, 1998. At trial, Dr. Davis will provide a basic explanation of how memory functions, and will then explain specific factors relating to this case that have been found in scientific studies to affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Dr. Davis also would testify that certain commonly held assumptions about identifications are not true. For example, Dr. Davis would testify that, contrary to popular belief, a witness's degree of confidence in an identification does not correlate with accuracy, and that stress impedes rather than improves the accuracy of memory. Dr. Davis would identify for the jury other factors and concepts that have been proven relevant to identification reliability, including such concepts as weapons focus; unconscious transference; problems with cross-racial identifications; the effects of witness collaboration on memory; and the suggestiveness of the particular "show-up" procedure used in this case. Each of these subject areas is directly relevant to this case, as demonstrated below.
Dr. Davis is well qualified as an expert in the fields of eyewitness identification, memory and recall. She earned a Ph.D. in Psychology at Ohio State University in 1973 and has been an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Nevada at Reno for approximately 21 years. Since earning her Ph.D., Dr. Davis has developed substantial expertise in the field of eyewitness identification. She has taught a number of graduate and undergraduate level courses focusing on this subject area, including courses in Psychology and Law, Memory and Social Cognition, Social Psychology, and Prejudice and Discrimination. Dr. Davis also has extensively reviewed the literature in the area of eyewitness identification throughout her career. Dr. Davis previously has testified as an expert witness in the field of eyewitness identification in a proceeding before a Nevada state court, and has provided expert advice to attorneys over the last tBG4"+U,&4V!Da q2[fr-2 MSTv;h6gӺqNe]) P thd~d:R=t9!Sqh}ቋ &D# d OQ`IDsz-&!YGer.[Dyw(gsGy 3 TXky-%eQ#!ȓ[`S]P Ņ}ǽ䚉*;AfdپQ'3rp]^1ȯr*??A0QCNY5UTT0l!)ӊ py<;UCUkG