IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

) Case No. xx-329M (JMF)

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, )

)

Defendant. )

___________________________________ )



MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF DETENTION ORDER AND

INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142 and 3145, defendant xxxxxxxx, through counsel, respectfully submits this motion for reconsideration of an order of pretrial detention entered on June 2, 1999, by this Court. The Court issued a written detention memorandum on June 7, 1999, which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. Mr. xxxxx requests release in light of the decision in United States v. Singleton, Case No. 99-3053 (D.C. Cir., June 25, 1999). The grounds for this motion are more fully stated in the accompanying memorandum. Mr. xxxxx requests a prompt hearing on this motion.

Respectfully submitted,



A.J. KRAMER

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

______________________________

Gregory L. Poe

Assistant Federal Public Defender 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 208-7500

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Mr. xxxxx is charged by criminal complaint with possessing a firearm as a convicted felon on or about June 1, 1999 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The detention order is based on the proposition that Mr. xxxxx poses a danger to the safety of the community. The sole predicate for the detention order, under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A), is that a § 922(g)(1) charge is ostensibly a "crime of violence" within the meaning of the Bail Reform Act. See Exhibit 1 at 4.(1) In United States v. Singleton, Case No. 99-3053 (D.C. Cir., June 25, 1999), the D.C. Circuit held that the "plain meaning of the Bail Reform Act excludes felon-in-possession offenses from the category of violent crimes that trigger detention hearings." Slip Op. at 2. Accordingly, no statutory basis exists on which to hold Mr. xxxxx as an ostensible danger to the community. Mr. xxxxx requests a prompt hearing on this motion.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, defendant Curnell xxxxx respectfully requests that the Court reconsider its June 2, 1999, order of detention and release Mr. xxxxx. Mr. xxxxx requests a prompt hearing on this motion.



Respectfully submitted,

A.J. KRAMER

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

_______________________________

Gregory L. Poe

Assistant Federal Public Defender 625 Indiana Avenue, N.W., Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 208-7500

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. )

) Case No. xx-329M (JMF)

xxxxxxxxxx xxxxx, )

)

Defendant. )

___________________________________ )



ORDER



Upon consideration of defendant Curnell xxxxx' Motion for Reconsideration of Detention Order and Incorporated Memorandum of Law, and in light of the entire record in this case, it is hereby

ORDERED that Mr. xxxxx' motion is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that Mr. xxxxx be released forthwith pending trial as reflected in a separate Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this ___ day of _____________, 1999.





____________________________________

THE HONORABLE JOHN M. FACCIOLA

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Copies to:



Gregory L. Poe

Assistant Federal Public Defender

625 Indiana Avenue, N.W.

Suite 550

Washington, D.C. 20004



Office of the United States Attorney

555 Fourth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 25th day of June, 1999, a copy of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration of a Detention Order and Incorporated Memorandum was served on the United States Attorney's Office, by hand delivering a copy to a receptacle at the United States District Courthouse, 3rd & Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., which has been provided for pleadings to be served upon the Office of the United States Attorney.



____________________________

Gregory L. Poe

Assistant Federal Public Defender

1. Under 18 U.S.C. §3142(f), a defendant may be held without bond only if a case involves (1) a "crime of violence;" (2) an offense with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment or death; (3) certain drug offenses with a maximum sentence of ten years or more; (4) any felony where the defendant has two or more prior convictions that would qualify under one of the first three subsections; (5) a serious risk of flight; or (6) serious risk that the defendant will obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice. Only the first category is at issue in this case.